May 23, 2006
By Army Sgt. 1st Class Michael Pintagro
Task Force Spartan Public Affairs NCOIC
FORWARD OPERATING BASE ASADABAD, Afghanistan – The senior Southwest Asia theater commander met with Task Force Spartan and Afghan National Army leaders and Soldiers operating in Kunar Province during a visit of Regional Command East May 2.
Army Gen. John P. Abizaid, U.S. Central Command commander, visited Operation Mountain Lion battlegrounds in northeast Afghanistan alongside Army Maj. Gen. Benjamin C. Freakley, commander of Combined Joint Task Force – 76, Army Brig. Gen. James Terry, CJTF – 76 deputy commanding general for operations, and Army Col. John Nicholson, commander of Task Force Spartan.
The battlefield visit began at Forward Operating Base Asadabad in northeast Afghanistan’s Kunar Province. Nicholson, Afghan National Army officials and senior American ANA advisors briefed the CENTCOM commander on Operation Mountain Lion, the disposition of friendly and hostile forces, and the composition of enemy organizations.
The leaders discussed issues ranging from the opium trade and regional economic development to the Pakistani border and future operations while gathered around a table-top map. The Asadabad Provincial Reconstruction Team commander, Army Lt. Col. Pete Munster, provided insights into local governance as well as regional construction projects.
Abizaid, a native of Coleville, Calif., asked the assembled leaders about issues ranging from key local industries to efforts at reconciliation with disaffected Afghans. He also queried ANA officials and advisors about ANA progress.
Army Lt. Col. Steven Bapp, combat advisor to 3rd Brigade, 201st ANA Corps, described Afghan military progress as brisk. He also emphasized the role of Afghan leadership in regional military efforts, noting the prominent role of ANA Brig. Gen. Zmarai, the brigade commander.
“It’s not my brigade,” said Bapp, a resident of Cocoa Beach, Fla. “It’s General Zmarai’s brigade — it’s not my army: it’s the Afghan people’s army.”
Abizaid quickly expanded on the point.
“It’s their country and their army,” he said. “It’s our job to work ourselves out of a job — if they don’t win, we don’t win.”
ANA leaders described relations with Coalition forces as close and constructive.
“We have been coordinating everything with the Coalition,” said ANA Maj. Aziz, 3rd Brigade, 201st ANA Corps intelligence officer. “We have been conducting operations side by side.
“We discuss issues all the time, and when we have some information we pass it to the Coalition and when the Coalition has information, they pass it on to us,” he added.
Abizaid discussed terrorist tactics, commenting on such desperate enemy devices as bombings and suicide attacks.
The CENTCOM commander also met with Marines serving in the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, Task Force Lava, as well as Soldiers serving in 1st Battalion, 32rd Infantry Regiment, Task Force Spartan. Abizaid received operational and terrain briefings from area leaders, including Army Lt. Col. Chris Cavoli, the 1-32 commander, and Marine Lt. Col. Chip Bierman, the Task Force Lava commander.
The general concluded his battlefield visit with a series of briefings and meetings in Jalalabad. He heard from key Task Force Spartan officers and PRT officials before departing for Bagram Airfield.
“The visit was extremely productive,” Nicholson said. “The Soldiers and Marines of Task Force Spartan enjoyed their time with him, and our commanders benefited form the opportunity to dialogue with the CENTCOM commander.
“The general made it clear from the start he wanted to discuss the tough issues and hear frank opinions,” the Baltimore native added. “He gave us a lot to think about, and I hope he returned to CENTCOM headquarters with some valuable input from the field.”
Abizaid assumed the top CENTCOM spot in July 2003, replacing Army Gen. Tommy Franks.
Again, the MSM has abandoned the war in Afghanistan. Reminds me of my time in the Mekong Delta, another theatre of combat the media ignored because it was primarily a South Vietnamese operation, and there were no 4 star hotels there. The media will flock to bad news in Afghanistan, but not positive news.
Rhod, you’re right. Now like back then, the media gathers it’s news at the hotel’s happy hour lounge, reports only that which will put the soldier and the country in a bad light and still manages to tip off the enemy to troop movements. Very few will share the privations of the soldier who often gets to sleep in the open with or without a cover, catch a meal when they can and still have the duty to protect that reporter who is going to drag their names and reputations in the mud of world opinion. The concept of good news and progress is alien, no need to build the morale of the soldier, of the nations citizens or the morale of the countrymen we are liberating by showing that our efforts are successful. Those guys in the media are awsome enemies.
Jack, you give me credit for Tom’s post.
Tom, even in-country in III Corps for almost 14 months (I extended), I knew almost nothing about the Delta. I heard about it when the 9th Division arrived, but all the attention seemed to be in the I Tri and the Central Highlands, when Khe Sanh and Calley weren’t in the news.
Mike Wallace showed up in Cu Chi in ’66 and made a big stink about some mortar attack deaths at the Repl Det. No PSP on the top of the bunker; three or four were killed. Wallace concluded that it was someone’s fault, rather than a sh** happens story. Even then Wallace was a troublemaker. Westmoreland came around from time to time to see how bad his S & D strategy was working out.
Right, Jack. Only the enemy suffers in the eyes of the MSM.
Sorry about the mixup Tom & Rhod, I guess I was upset thinking about all the duplicity pulled on us by the press, even by Stars & Stripes. The only reason I heard anything about the Delta was because a friend in my unit had a brother fighting down there. The only time I saw non military reporters was in the rear, then they’d take a picture, caption it to another event then mis-quote any interviews they’d made. We had one platoon assigned to Phu Bai supporting it and units in the Ashau Valley. Another thing that pissed me off was during the Hamburger Hill battle at Dong Ap Bia, our dead were so heavy that we set up temporary morgues because the official two mortuary’s couldn’t process them all then their names were leaked by S&S as if they were part of the normal weekly casualties. You can’t trust the press at all.
Jack:
Absolutely correct. I think it was Hamburger Hill…was that the same as Hill 881?…the photos in Life magazine of the Marine Corpsman with a non-fuctioning AR-15 or an early M-16 were a blockbuster.
Then Life’s photos of the chaos in the VA hospital.
I came back in’67, but remember the major network news closing with the names of the weekly dead. I think it was in May of that year that we had 2200 killed and wounded in a single month.
I’m still troubled by the whole thing. We betrayed the Vietnamese at the end, but Westmoreland was a F**k-up all the same.
Gentlemen, that horrible battle took place from May 11-21 1969 at Hill 937 on the west end of the Ashau Valley, some 70 dead and 370 wounded. The U.S Morturary at Danang didn’t have enough refrigeration for them all at the time, foodstuffs were moved into consolidated storage and some bodies were stored on litters in refrigerated vans at Chu Lai until they were shipped to Danang. Just so much meat to Westmoreland, McNamara, et al. It was tough to feed at the mess halls after that. Thankfully, today our troops aren’t fed into a meat grinder like that by egomaniacs from overstuffed armchairs in Washington.