12 Oct

USS Cole ~ “Determined Warrior”



USS Cole


(DDG 67)


“Determined Warrior”

On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole (DDG 67) was attacked/bombed in the Port of Aden in Yemen by terrorists.
Think about the USS Cole, think about that ship and what those sailors were going through at that moment with that impact. In the dark, there was twisted steel, they had gaseous fumes, toxic fumes. They were operating under all kinds of adverse conditions, and then the power generation went out and they had to bail the water out by hand. And they were doing it all while they were saving other members who had been injured, and trying to recover those who had been killed.
Let us never forget our Heroes and never forget those that gave their all on the USS Cole.
– Wild Thing

A pilot’s reflections

This was written by one of the helicopter pilots assigned to USS Hawes that was there to help when the attack on the USS Cole happened……… the letter speaks for itself.
It wasn’t until a few days ago though, that we started doing something that I feel may be the first thing I’ve seen in my short Naval career that has truly made a difference. Right now we’re supporting the USS COLE and her crew in Aden.
When the attack occurred we were a day away. Just by luck we happened to be on our way out of the Gulf and headed towards the Suez and could get here in a relatively short amount of time. I know what you all have seen on CNN, because we have seen it too. I just want you all to know that what you see doesn’t even scratch the surface.
I’m not going to get into it for obvious reasons. But I will tell you that right now there are 250+ sailors just a few miles away living in hell on Earth. I’m sitting in a nice air conditioned state room, they’re sleeping out on the decks at night. You can’t even imagine the conditions they’re living in, and yet they are still fighting 24 hours a day to save their ship and free the bodies of those still trapped and send them home.
As bad as it is, they’re doing an incredible job. The very fact that these people are still functioning is beyond my comprehension. Whatever you imagine as the worst, multiply it by ten and you might get there. Today I was tasked to photo rig the ship and surrounding area. It looked so much worse than I had imagined, unbelievable really, with debris and disarray everywhere, the ship listing, the hole in her side.
I wish I had the power to relay to you all what I have seen, but words just won’t do it. I do want to tell you the first thing that jumped out at me – the Stars and Stripes flying. I can’t tell you how that made me feel…even in this God forsaken hell hole our flag was more beautiful than words can describe.
Then I started to notice the mass of activity going on below, scores of people working non-stop in 90 plus degree weather to save this ship. They’re doing it with almost no electrical power and they’re sleeping (when they can sleep) outside on the decks because they can’t stand the smell or the heat or the darkness inside. They only want to eat what we bring them because they’re all scared of eating something brought by the local vendors.
Even with all that, the USS COLE and her crew is sending a message guys, and it’s that even acts of cowardice and hate can do nothing to the spirit and pride of the United States. I have never been so proud of what I do, or of the men and women that I serve with as I was today.
There are sixteen confirmed dead sailors who put it on the line for all of us, and some of them are still trapped here. Please take a minute to pray for their families and say a word of thanks for their sacrifice – one made so that we can live the lives that we do. All of you that serve with me, thank you. All of you that have loved ones that serve, thank you.

A tribute to the men and women of the U.S.S. COLE
My cargo, so precious, I carried with pride;
Brave men and women who stood side by side.
The stars and stripes, waving so high up above;
My country, my mission, any vessel would love.
My sailors all knew their assignment, full well.
They performed at top merit, their Captains would tell.
As a unit, they stood all together as one;
So deserving of honor, America’s daughters and sons.
This wasn’t a war, just a bright sunny day.
A sudden shudder tore my hull away;
A gaping hole, letting water inside.
With that thunderous blast, some had died.
My sirens were screaming, flames reaching high.
Sailors were moaning and so was I!
Work hard men and women! We must not fail!
Seal off the compartments! It’s too much to bail!
All the medics were working, at a feverish pace;
Scenes of pure heroism all over the place!
The strongest were praying, while their muscles of steel
Assisted in any way they could see or feel.
When darkness fell we scarcely noticed at all,
Aching to hear every voice at roll call.
Finally, the moving memorial came,
Only because of those heroes so brave.
My stars and stripes, (lower), still flew just the same;
All our beautiful children accounted for by name.
Now I stood naked, before the whole world;
Men working feverishly where bombs had been hurled.
My heroes are living and healing and dead
And I will come home, just the way I am led.
You’ll welcome me home, as you always do.
The cheers will be heard by all of my crew.
We’re still wounded, still healing, but proud just the same
And the U.S.S. Cole will serve you again.
For you’ll build back my hull, with a star and a story,
To the tip of the flagpole raise high Old Glory.
We’ll always remember FREEDOM’S NOT FREE!!!
And we’ll never forget HEROES LIKE THESE!

On February 3, 2006, 23 suspected or convicted Al-Qaeda members escaped from jail in Yemen. This number included 13 who were convicted of the USS Cole bombings and the bombing of the French tanker Limburg in 2002. Among those who reportedly escaped was Al-Badawi. For more on this, please read this article on the escape by Jane Novak, of Armies of Liberation.
Other Tributes to the USS Cole are at Linda’s, Something…and Half of Something. Linda has an awesome tribute and the photos of the brave men and women we lost but never forgotten that horrible day.

12 Oct

U.S. Weighs First Treason Charges in Over 50 Years




Adam Gadahn is seen in these undated pictures released by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

WASHINGTON
A California-born convert to Islam could become the first American accused of treason since World War Two after he appeared in al Qaeda videos, sources familiar with the man’s case said on Wednesday.
They said U.S. prosecutors were strongly considering bringing the charges, which carry a maximum punishment of death, against Adam Gadahn, 28, who is believed to be overseas and is not in U.S. custody.
The charges could come as early as Wednesday.
The U.S. Justice Department last brought treason charges, during the World War Two era, the sources said.
Gadahn, who is also known on the videos as Azzam the American, has been involved in a propaganda campaign of the Islamic militant group, the sources said. Some of the videos have threatened attacks against the United States.
He converted to Islam from a Judeo-Christian family when he was 17 and a few years later moved to Pakistan. He previously was known as Adam Pearlman and grew up on a goat ranch outside Los Angeles.
The FBI has sought to question him since May 2004.
Besides treason, prosecutors have prepared other criminal charges against Gadahn, the sources said. They declined to give specific details.
AL QAEDA
The sources denied the case was timed to deflect attention from the fallout over lewd computer messages sent by a former Republican congressman to young male aides, a scandal that may help Democrats seize control of Congress in November 7 election.
The FBI has said that Gadahn attended al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, that he has been associated with al Qaeda’s leaders and that he has done translations for al Qaeda.
His last video was posted on a Web site on September 2.

“If the Zionist crusader missionaries of hate and counter-Islam consultants like … the crusader and chief George W. Bush were to abandon their unbelief and repent and enter into the light of Islam and turn their swords against the enemies of God, it would be accepted of them and they would be our brothers in Islam,” Gadahn said in English.

Al Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahri, made a brief statement at the start of the tape urging viewers to listen carefully to the message.
U.S. officials believe Gadahn appeared in another video last year, right before the anniversary of the September 11 attacks, threatening al Qaeda attacks on Los Angeles and Melbourne, Australia.
They also believe Gadahn threatened attacks in a video released in October 2004, just before the U.S. presidential election.


Wild Thing’s comment…….
May I please add a few other candidates and they would be a lot easier to find since they are usually in Washington and one that does not work out of Washington???? The only difference between this guy and Hanoi Jane is is he doesn’t appear to have a line of exercise videos.
So I guess now we just wait and see what names start to show up that say no way José can this man be charged with treason. Tick tock tick tock, when will Harry Reid, Pelosi etc. run up the clock. Oh and of course terrorist’s lover CAIR will be burning a candle in their window to welcome Adam Gadahn to some safe place to hide and then he can do videos of his whine of being picked on.
Hahaha The enemy is just ever so predictable.

12 Oct

Susan Estrich Become Counsel For Terrorist Supporter




Two high-profile lawyers join Islamic charity case
WORCESTER— A pair of nationally recognized lawyers have been retained to argue First Amendment issues in a criminal case involving an Islamic charity and two of its officers who are charged with misrepresenting the charity’s work.
Susan R. Estrich, a lawyer, author and media pundit, who managed Michael S. Dukakis’ 1988 presidential campaign, and Harvey A. Silverglate, a noted Cambridge criminal defense lawyer, entered appearances Thursday as counsel for Emadeddin Z. Muntasser of Brookline. He is accused of misleading the government about the nature of Care International Inc., a charity the government claims supported jihadist and mujahedin organizations.
Muhammed Mubayyid of Shrewsbury is also charged in the case, which is being heard in U.S. District Court in Worcester.
Mr. Silverglate said he and Ms. Estrich were drawn to the case because of several First Amendment issues, including freedom of religion and freedom of speech. He said criminal cases rarely involve First Amendment issues.

“This is a case involving free speech,” Mr. Silverglate said. “All of the conduct outlined in the indictment is protected by the Constitution…. You don’t get that many criminal cases that are directly in violation of the First Amendment.”

Ms. Estrich, a frequent guest on CNN and Fox News, is on a book tour and was unavailable for comment last night, according to an assistant at her Los Angeles office.
Her latest book, “Soulless: Ann Coulter and the Right-Wing Church of Hate,” is scheduled to be released today. She has represented many high-profile clients including Leona Helmsley, Claus von Bulow and Michael Milken.
Mr. Silverglate, former president of the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, has also represented high-profile clients, including Louise Woodward, the British nanny who was convicted of manslaughter. There are several other defense lawyers on the case.
Asked whether he was being paid for his work, Mr. Silverglate replied that he never discusses financial arrangements that he has made with his clients.
Mr. Muntasser continues also to be represented by Malick W. Ghachem, Norman S. Zalkind and Elizabeth A. Lunt. Mubayyid is represented by Michael C. Andrews.
Mr. Silverglate said that he could not represent both defendants because that would pose a potential conflict of interest.
In recent court filings, the defense lawyers called the case a prime example of the government trying to “rewrite history” to suit its purposes after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
They contended that it also shows the government prefers other religions, including Christianity and Judaism, over Islam, and that the alleged criminal activity was actually the exercise of a religious right.
Last Thursday, Mr. Muntasser and Mr. Mubayyid’s lawyers submitted a motion to dismiss the indictment against them.
The lawyers made several arguments for a dismissal, including that the U.S. government supported and organized charities that also supported jihadist and mujahedin organizations in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation there, and, that it is a constitutionally-protected right to solicit or promote such religious efforts.
“Religion permeates this entire case,” the memorandum in support of the motion said. “Care was set up to advance religious goals; jihad is a religious concept; zakat (giving to charity) is a religious obligation; support for the mujahedin is, according to certain interpretations of the Koran, a religious command. It is absolutely clear that the government is not free to prefer one religion over another: If Jews and Catholics are free to raise money and support their chosen causes domestically and internationally, no different rules may be applied …

“At the heart of this case is the right of an established religious charity to collect funds and distribute literature. That right has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, even where municipalities and other local governments found the message of the charities offensive and their fundraising downright reprehensible. That speech protection is at its greatest when the underlying cause is religious in nature; and it does not matter that solicitation of funds is involved.”

Both men were indicted in May 2005. Mr. Mubayyid, a Lebanese national, pleaded not guilty to charges of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government, aiding and abetting a scheme to conceal material facts from the Internal Revenue Service, and to three counts of filing false tax returns. Mr. Muntasser, a Libyan national, pleaded not guilty to charges of engaging in a scheme to conceal material facts from the government, conspiring to defraud the government and making false statements. Both men are free on bond while awaiting trial.
The men are not charged with providing material support to terrorist organizations. Rather, they are charged with scheming to conceal the fact that Care was an “outgrowth of and successor to the Al-Kifah Refugee Center,” an organization that was implicated in the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York on Feb. 26, 1993. The government contends that had the IRS known that Care’s activities were listed as distributing information about jihad and raising money for various jihadi groups, it would not have been granted 501(c)(3) nonprofit status.
The memorandum raised many controversial issues, including the U.S. government’s role in establishing charities in the 1980s to support mujahedin and the jihad against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. The memorandum cites several charities given 501 c(3) status by the IRS for promoting and aiding the Afghan jihad, including, the National Endowment for Democracy, The American Friends of Afghanistan, and, The Free Afghanistan Alliance, among others.
“Activities that were considered charitable in 1985, 1989, 1991, or 1992 do not become non-charitable in 1993 because the identity of the donor changes, or because the United States’ strategic interest in jihad has lessened,” according to the memorandum.
The court filing also takes issue with the government’s classification of “zakat” which is a Muslim obligation to donate a portion of their earnings to charitable causes. According to the memorandum, the teachings of the Quran says Muslims have an obligation to give “zakat” and that “the mujahedin are widely interpreted to be one of the eight categories of recipients entitled to zakat.”
The government raided a Northboro storage facility and confiscated records kept by Care. More than 18,000 pages of material were taken, in addition to 40 videotapes, four computer hard drives and 100 computer diskettes, among other evidence.
The FBI claims that Care International raised about $1.7 million from 1993 to 2003, when it ceased to operate. Care International claimed it raised money for widows and orphans, but it also raised money for terror groups, according to the FBI. Court records in the Worcester case say checks deposited into Care International accounts had phrases such as “for jihad only” and “Bosnia Jihad fund” and “Chechen Muslim Fighters” handwritten on the memo lines of donors’ personal checks.
Mr. Muntasser told a member of the agency’s Joint Terrorism Task Force that he visited Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1994 for humanitarian purposes. He later told a federal immigration officer that he traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan seven times between March 1993 and November 1997, including one 30-day trip to the two countries from December 1994 to January 1995.


Wild Thing’s comment……
No surprise to me that she would do such a thing. Just more proof of how left the left is in our country. If the left keeps going further left will they fall off the face of the earth? hahaha Just a nice thought!

12 Oct

Fall With It’s Unique Treasures




Autumn, Mount Desert Island, Maine

Earth Tone Treasures
Orange tints fade to yellow rust
and cold fall rains pull them down
and the ground carpeted with summer past
its just the same here all over town
summer fled warm times now bust
Crisp crackling leaf piles to jump in,
and wade through in happy moments
in our inner childlike joy long as they last
a vivid gift of the passing season sent
missed until they finally come again
wild thing

I love the seasons and Fall has such a clean crisp feel to it. I thought I would share this with all of you.

12 Oct

The Funniest “Dam” Story!



The Dam
This is an actual letter sent to a man named Ryan DeVries by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Quality, State of Pennsylvania.
This guy’s response is hilarious, but read the State’s letter before you get to the response letter.
SUBJECT: DEQ File No.97-59-0023; T11N; R10W, Sec. 20; Ly-coming County

Dear Mr. DeVries:
It has come to the attention of the Department of Environmental Quality that there has been recent unauthorized activity on the above referenced parcel of property. You have been certified as the legal landowner and/or contractor who did the following unauthorized activity:
Construction and maintenance of two wood debris dams across the outlet stream of Spring Pond. A permit must be issued prior to the start of this type of activity.
A review of the Department’s files shows that no permits have been issued. Therefore, the Department has determined that this activity is in violation of Part 301, Inland Lakes and Streams, of the Natural Resource and Environmental Protection Act, Act 451 of the Public Acts of 1994, being sections 324.30101 to 324.30113 of the Pennsylvania Compiled Laws, annotated.
The Department has been informed that one or both of the dams partially failed during a recent rain event, causing debris and flooding at downstream locations. We find that dams of this nature are inherently hazardous and cannot be permitted. The Department therefore orders you to cease and desist all activities at this location, and to restore the stream to a free-flow condition by removing all wood and brush forming the dams from the stream channel. All restoration work shall be completed no later than January 31, 2006.
Please notify this office when the restoration has been completed so that a follow-up site inspection may be scheduled by our staff.
Failure to comply with this request or any further unauthorized activity on the site may result in this case being referred for elevated enforcement action.
We anticipate and would appreciate your full cooperation in this matter. Please feel free to contact me at this office if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
David L. Price
District Representative and Water Management Division.

Here is the actual response sent back by Mr. DeVries:
Re: DEQ File No. 97-59-0023; T11N; R10W, Sec. 20; Lycoming County
Dear Mr. Price,
Your certified letter dated 12/17/02 has been handed to me to respond to. I am the legal landowner but not the Contractor at 2088 Dagget Lane, Trout Run, Pennsylvania.
A couple of beavers are in the (State unauthorized) process of constructing and maintaining two wood “debris” dams across the outlet stream of my Spring Pond. While I did not pay for, authorize, nor supervise their dam project, I think they would be highly offended that you call their skillful use of natures building materials “debris.” I
would like to challenge your department to attempt to emulate their dam project any time and/or any place you choose. I believe I can safely state there is no way you could ever match their dam skills, their dam resourcefulness, their dam ingenuity, their dam persistence, their dam determination and/or their dam work ethic.
As to your request, I do not think the beavers are aware that they must first fill out a dam permit prior to the start of this type of dam activity.
My first dam question to you is:
(1) Are you trying to discriminate against my Spring Pond Beavers, or
(2) do you require all beavers throughout this State to conform to said dam request?
If you are not discriminating against these particular beavers, through the Freedom of Information Act, I request completed copies of all those other applicable beaver dam permits that have been issued.
Perhaps we will see if there really is a dam violation of Part 301,
Inland Lakes and Streams, of the Natural Resource and Environmental
Protection Act, Act 451 of the Public Acts of 1994, being sections
324.30101 to 324.30113 of the Pennsylvania Compiled Laws, annotated.
I have several concerns. My first concern is, aren’t the beavers entitled to legal representation? The Spring Pond Beavers are financially destitute and are unable to pay for said representation — so the State will have to provide them with a dam lawyer. The Department’s dam concern that either one or both of the dams failed during a recent rain event, causing flooding, is proof that this is a natural occurrence, which the Department is required to protect. In other words, we should leave the Spring Pond Beavers alone rather than harassing them and calling their dam names.
If you want the stream “restored” to a dam free-flow condition please contact the beavers — but if you are going to arrest them, they obviously did not pay any attention to your dam letter, they being unable to read English.
In my humble opinion, the Spring Pond Beavers have a right to build their unauthorized dams as long as the sky is blue, the grass is green, and water flows downstream. They have more dam rights than I do to live and enjoy Spring Pond. If the Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection lives up to its name, it should protect the natural resources (Beavers) and the environment (Beavers’ Dams).
So, as far as the beavers and I are concerned, this dam case can be referred for more elevated enforcement action right now. Why wait until 1/31/2006? The Spring Pond Beavers may be under the dam ice then: and there will be no way for you or your dam staff to contact/harass them then.
In conclusion, I would like to bring to your attention to a real environmental quality, health, problem in the area. It is the bears!
Bears are actually defecating in our woods. I definitely believe you should be persecuting the defecating bears and leave the beavers alone. If you are going to investigate the beaver dam, watch your step! The bears are not careful where they dump!
Being unable to comply with your dam request, and being unable to contact you on your dam answering machine, I am sending this response to your dam office.
THANK YOU.
RYAN DEVRIES & THE DAM BEAVERS

11 Oct

Democrat Kerry Speaks of Killing The Bird At 1600 Pennsylvania



After telling Maher that he ( Kerry) and his wife went to Vermont to celebrate her birthday, Kerry has this exchange with Maher.
Maher: “You could have went to New Hampshire and killed 2 birds with one stone.”
Kerry: “I could have gone to 1600 Pennsylvania and killed the real bird with one stone.”


Wild Thing’s comment…….
Democrats, all of them are the lowest of the low! I will never forgive how the left gets away with this kind of shit and they do it time and again. Cindy Sheehan said the same about killing Bush, only even more direct in her wording. Does she get in trouble for this or does Kerry? Hell NO!
People used to be arrested for threatening the President of the United States.


* Stop the ACLU

11 Oct

CIA Report Speaks Volumes About Clinton Years



Wild Thing’s comment…..
When Bill Clinton was President he knew of this information. He also knew that if he did nothing about it then the next President would have to deal with it. Because Bill Clinton most certainly favored the enemy of America anyway and did not know what to do about the information below he did nothing.
All of this below built up during the Clinton years as you can see by the dates throughout the report.
I realize it is very long, and I apologize for the length. I found it very interesting and very telling. I am putting the entire thing here in case any of you would also like to read it or have it for a reference.
On Hannity yesterday, General Tommy Franks said the democrats “kicked the can along” instead of doing anything substantive. Hence we wound up with Al Qaeda, Saddam, Iran and North Korea.

Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions,
1 July Through 31 December 2000

CIA.gov report
Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report in response to a Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY 97 Intelligence Authorization Act, which requires:
“(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on

(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and
(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries.”

At the DCI’s request, the DCI Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the Intelligence Community. As directed by Section 721, subsection (b) of the Act, it is unclassified. As such, the report does not present the details of the Intelligence Community’s assessments of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions programs that are available in other classified reports and briefings for the Congress.
Acquisition by Country:
As required by Section 721 of the FY 97 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are summaries by country of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 July through 31 December 2000. We excluded countries that already have substantial WMD programs, such as China and Russia, as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity of concern.

IRAN

Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD and ACW technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop a domestic capability to produce various types of weapons—chemical, biological, and nuclear—and their delivery systems. During the reporting period, the evidence indicates determined Iranian efforts to acquire WMD- and ACW-related equipment, materials, and technology focused primarily on entities in Russia, China, North Korea, and Western Europe.
Iran, a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) States party, already has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons — including blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents, and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them. During the second half of 2000, Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare (CW) program from entities in Russia and China.
Tehran continued its efforts to seek considerable dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise from abroad—primarily from entities in Russia and Western Europe—ostensibly for civilian uses. We judge that this equipment and know-how could be applied to Iran’s biological warfare (BW) program. Iran probably began its offensive BW program during the Iran-Iraq war, and it may have some limited capability for BW deployment.
Iran sought nuclear-related equipment, material, and technical expertise from a variety of sources, especially in Russia. Work continues on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power reactor at Bushehr that will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In addition, Russian entities continued to interact with Iranian research centers on various activities. These projects will help Iran augment its nuclear technology infrastructure, which in turn would be useful in supporting nuclear weapons research and development. The expertise and technology gained, along with the commercial channels and contacts established—particularly through the Bushehr nuclear power plant project—could be used to advance Iran’s nuclear weapons research and development program.
Beginning in January 1998, the Russian Government took a number of steps to increase its oversight of entities involved in dealings with Iran and other states of proliferation concern. In 1999, it pushed a new export control law through the Duma. Russian firms, however, faced economic pressures to circumvent these controls and did so in some cases. The Russian Government, moreover, failed to enforce its export controls in some cases regarding Iran. A component of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) contracted with Iran to provide equipment clearly intended for Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS). The laser equipment was to have been delivered in late 2000 but continues to be held up as a result of US protests. AVLIS technology could provide Iran the means to produce weapons quantities of highly enriched uranium.
China pledged in October 1997 to halt cooperation on a uranium conversion facility (UCF) and not to engage in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran but said it would complete cooperation on two nuclear projects: a small research reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that Iran will use to produce cladding for reactor fuel. As a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear fuel, but safeguards are not required for the zirconium plant or its products.
Iran has attempted to use its civilian energy program, which is quite modest in scope, to justify its efforts to establish domestically or otherwise acquire assorted nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities. But such capabilities can also support fissile material production for a weapons program, and we believe it is this objective that drives Iran’s efforts to acquire relevant facilities. For example, Iran has sought to obtain turnkey facilities, such as the UCF, that ostensibly would be used to support fuel production for the Bushehr power plant. But the UCF could be used in any number of ways to support fissile material production needed for a nuclear weapon—specifically, production of uranium hexafluoride for use as a feedstock for uranium enrichment operations and production of uranium compounds suitable for use as fuel in a plutonium production reactor. In addition, we suspect that Tehran most likely is interested in acquiring foreign fissile material and technology for weapons development as part of its overall nuclear weapons program.
During the second half of 2000, entities in Russia, North Korea, and China continued to supply crucial ballistic missile–related equipment, technology, and expertise to Iran. Tehran is using assistance from foreign suppliers and entities to support current development and production programs and to achieve its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Iran already is producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and is in the late stages of developing the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). Iran has built and publicly displayed prototypes for the Shahab-3 and has tested the Shahab-3 three times—July 1998, July 2000, and September 2000. In addition, Iran has publicly acknowledged the development of a Shahab-4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic missile than the Shahab-3 but later categorizing it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran’s Defense Minister also has publicly mentioned plans for a “Shahab-5”. Such statements, made against the backdrop of sustained cooperation with Russian, North Korean, and Chinese entities, strongly suggest that Tehran intends to develop a longer-range ballistic missile capability.
Iran continues to seek and acquire conventional weapons and production technologies primarily from Russia and China. Following Russia’s public abrogation of the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement in November 2000, Iran has expressed interest in acquiring a variety of Russian air, naval and ground weapons. Russia has continued to deliver on contracts signed prior to the 1995 agreement. During the second half of 2000, Iran continued to negotiate for and receive Mi-171 helicopters form Russia. Naval acquisitions from a variety of countries continue. Tehran also has been able to keep operational at least part of its existing fleet of Western-origin aircraft and helicopters supplied before the 1979 Iranian Revolution and continues to develop limited capabilities to produce armor, artillery, tactical missiles, munitions, and aircraft with foreign assistance.

IRAQ

Since Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, Baghdad has refused to allow United Nations inspectors into Iraq as required by Security Council Resolution 687. In spite of ongoing UN efforts to establish a follow-on inspection regime comprising the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA’s Iraq Action Team, no UN inspections occurred during this reporting period. Moreover, the automated video monitoring system installed by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq is no longer operating. Having lost this on-the-ground access, it is more difficult for the UN or the US to accurately assess the current state of Iraq’s WMD programs.
Given Iraq’s past behavior, it is likely that Iraq has used the period since Desert Fox to reconstitute prohibited programs. We assess that since the suspension of UN inspections in December of 1998, Baghdad has had the capability to reinitiate both its CW and BW programs within a few weeks to months. Without an inspection-monitoring program, however, it is more difficult to determine if Iraq has done so.
Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its missile production facilities. It has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. This equipment—in principle subject to UN scrutiny—also could be diverted for WMD purposes. Since the suspension of UN inspections in December 1998, the risk of diversion has increased. After Desert Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction effort on those facilities destroyed by the US bombing, including several critical missile production complexes and former dual-use CW production facilities. In addition, Iraq appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly for production of CW agents.
UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in December 1998 that Iraq also continued to withhold information related to its CW program. For example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Air Force document discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s as had been declared by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates that Iraq may have hidden an additional 6,000 CW munitions.
In 1995, Iraq admitted to having an offensive BW program and submitted the first in a series of Full, Final, and Complete Disclosures (FFCDs) that were supposed to reveal the full scope of its BW program. According to UNSCOM, these disclosures are incomplete and filled with inaccuracies. Since the full scope and nature of Iraq’s BW program was not verified, UNSCOM had assessed that Iraq continued to maintain a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any time, if the decision is made to do so. In the absence of UNSCOM or other inspections and monitoring since late 1998, we remain concerned that Iraq may again be producing biological warfare agents.
Iraq has continued working on its L-29 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, which involves converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe. It is believed that Iraq has conducted flights of the L-29, possibly to test system improvements or to train new pilots. These refurbished trainer aircraft are believed to have been modified for delivery of chemical or, more likely, biological warfare agents.
We believe that Iraq has probably continued low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program. A sufficient source of fissile material remains Iraq’s most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon. Although we were already concerned about a reconstituted nuclear weapons program, our concerns were increased last September when Saddam publicly exhorted his “Nuclear Mujahidin” to “defeat the enemy.”
Iraq continues to pursue development of SRBM systems that are not prohibited by the United Nations and may be expanding to longer-range systems. Pursuit of UN-permitted missiles continues to allow Baghdad to develop technological improvements and infrastructure that could be applied to a longer-range missile program. We believe that development of the liquid-propellant Al-Samoud SRBM probably is maturing and that a low-level operational capability could be achieved in the near term — which is further suggested by the appearance of four Al Samoud transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) with airframes at the 31 December Al Aqsa Cal parade. The solid-propellant missile development program may now be receiving a higher priority, and development of the Ababil-100 SRBM – two of such airframes and TELs were paraded on 31 December—and possibly longer range systems may be moving ahead rapidly. If economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted, Baghdad probably would increase its attempts to acquire missile-related items from foreign sources, regardless of any future UN monitoring and continuing restrictions on long-range ballistic missile programs. Iraq probably retains a small, covert force of Scud-type missiles.
Iraq’s ACW acquisitions remain low due to the generally successful enforcement of the UN arms embargo. The weapons and ACW-related goods which have been delivered to Iraq tend to be smaller arms transported over porous land borders. Iraq continues, however, to aggressively seek ACW equipment and technology.

NORTH KOREA

During this time frame, North Korea continued procurement of raw materials and components for its ballistic missile programs from various foreign sources, especially through North Korean firms based in China. We assess that North Korea is capable of producing and delivering via munitions a wide variety of chemical and biological agents.
During the remainder of 2000, P’yongyang continued its attempts to procure technology worldwide that could have applications in its nuclear program, but we do not know of any procurement directly linked to the nuclear weapons program. We assess that North Korea has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. The United States and North Korea completed the canning of all accessible spent fuel rods and rod fragments in April 2000 in accordance with the 1994 Agreed Framework. That reactor fuel contains enough plutonium for several more weapons.

LYBIA

Libya is continuing its efforts to obtain ballistic missile–related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources. Outside assistance—particularly Serbian, Indian, North Korean and Chinese—is critical to it ballistic missile development programs, and the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 has allowed Tripoli to expand its procurement effort. Libya’s current capability probably remains limited to its Scud B missiles, but with continued foreign assistance it may achieve an MRBM capability—a long-desired goal—or extended-range Scud capability.
Libya remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and other key CW-related equipment. Following the suspension of UN sanctions in April 1999, Tripoli reestablished contacts with sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals abroad, primarily in Western Europe. Libya still appears to have a goal of establishing an offensive CW capability and an indigenous production capability for weapons. Evidence suggests Libya also is seeking to acquire the capability to develop and produce BW agents.
Libya—an NPT party with full scope IAEA safeguards—continues to develop its nuclear research and development program but would still require significant foreign assistance to advance a nuclear weapons option. The suspension of UN sanctions has accelerated the pace of procurement efforts in Libya’s drive to rejuvenate its ostensibly civilian nuclear program. In January and November 2000, for example, Tripoli and Moscow renewed talks on cooperation at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center and discussed a potential power reactor deal. Should such civil-sector work come to fruition, Libya could gain opportunities to pursue technologies that could be diverted for military purposes.
Following the suspension of UN sanctions, Libya has negotiated—and perhaps completed—contracts with Russian firms for conventional weapons, munitions, and upgrades and refurbishment for its existing inventory of Soviet-era weapons.

SYRIA

Syria sought CW-related precursors and expertise from foreign sources during the reporting period. Damascus already has a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, and it would appear that Syria is trying to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable that Syria also is developing an offensive BW capability.
We will continue to monitor the potential for Syria’s nuclear R&D program to expand.
During the second half of 2000, Damascus continued work on establishing a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability with help from outside countries. Foreign equipment and assistance to its liquid-propellant missile program—primarily from North Korean entities, but also from firms in Russia—have been and will continue to be essential for Syria’s effort. Damascus also continued its efforts to assemble—probably with considerable North Korean assistance—liquid-fueled Scud C missiles.
Syria continues to acquire ACW—mainly from Russia and other FSU suppliers—although at a reduced level from the early 1990s. During the past few years, Syria has received Kornet-E (AT-14), Metis-M (AT-13), Konkurs (AT-5), and Bastion-M (AT-10B) antitank guided missiles, RPG-29 rocket launchers, and small arms. Damascus has expressed interest in acquiring Russian Su-27 and MiG-29 fighters and air defense systems, but its outstanding debt to Moscow and inability to fund large purchases have hampered negotiations.

SUDAN

In the WMD arena, Sudan, a CWC States Party, has been developing the capability to produce chemical weapons for many years. In this pursuit, it historically has obtained help from entities in other countries, principally Iraq. Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well.
During the reporting period, Sudan sought to acquire a variety of military equipment from various sources. Khartoum is seeking older, less expensive ACW and conventional weapons that nonetheless are advanced compared with the capabilities of the weapons possessed by its opponents and their supporters in neighboring countries in the long-running civil war.

INDIA

India continues its nuclear weapons development program, for which its underground nuclear tests in May 1998 were a significant milestone. The acquisition of foreign equipment will benefit New Delhi in its efforts to develop and produce more sophisticated nuclear weapons. During this reporting period, India continued to obtain foreign assistance for its civilian nuclear power program, primarily from Russia.
India continues to rely on foreign assistance for key missile technologies, where it still lacks engineering or production expertise. Entities in Russia and Western Europe remained the primary conduits of missile-related and dual-use technology transfers during the latter half of 2000.
India continues an across-the-board modernization of its armed forces through ACW acquisitions, mostly from Russia, although many of its key programs have been plagued by delays. During the reporting period, New Delhi concluded a $3 billion contract with Russia to produce under license 140 Su-30 multirole fighters and continued negotiations with Moscow for 310 T-90S main battle tanks, A-50 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft, Tu-22M Backfire maritime strike bombers, and an aircraft carrier. India also continues to explore options for leasing or purchasing several AWACS systems from other entities. India also signed a contract with France for 10 additional Mirage 2000H multirole fighters and is considering offers for jet trainer aircraft from France and the United Kingdom. In addition to helping India with the development of its indigenous nuclear-powered submarine, Russia is negotiating with India the possible lease of a Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine.

PAKISTAN

Chinese entities continued to provide significant assistance to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program during the reporting period. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan is moving toward serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs, such as the Shaheen-I and Haider-I. Pakistan flight-tested the Shaheen-I in 1999 and plans to flight-test the Haider-I in 2001. Successful development of the two-stage Shaheen-II MRBM will require continued Chinese assistance or assistance from other potential sources.
Pakistan continued to acquire nuclear-related and dual-use equipment and materials from various sources—principally in Western Europe. Islamabad has a well-developed nuclear weapons program, as evidenced by its first nuclear weapons tests in late May 1998. Acquisition of nuclear-related goods from foreign sources will remain important if Pakistan chooses to develop more advanced nuclear weapons. China, which has provided extensive support in the past to Islamabad’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, in May 1996 pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in any state, including Pakistan. We cannot rule out, however, some unspecified contacts between Chinese entities and entities involved in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development.
Pakistan continues to rely on China and France for its ACW requirements and negotiated to purchase an additional 40 F-7 fighters from China.

EGYPT

During the last half of 2000, Egypt maintained a relationship with North Korea on ballistic missiles and maintained a Scud inventory. Egypt’s ACW acquisition trends aim toward modernizing its Soviet-era equipment and acquiring newer, mostly US weapons.

KEY SUPPLIERS

RUSSIA

Despite improvements in Russia’s economy, the state-run defense and nuclear industries remain strapped for funds, even as Moscow looks to them for badly needed foreign exchange through exports. We remain very concerned about the proliferation implications of such sales in several areas. Monitoring Russian proliferation behavior, therefore, will remain a very high priority.
Russian entities during the reporting period continued to supply a variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries such as Iran, India, China, and Libya. Iran’s earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities has helped to accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and continuing Russian assistance likely supports Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and increase Tehran’s self-sufficiency in missile production.
Russia also remained a key supplier for civilian nuclear programs in Iran, primarily focused on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant project. With respect to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, Russian assistance enhances Iran’s ability to support a nuclear weapons development effort, even though the ostensible purpose of most of this assistance is for civilian applications. Despite Iran’s NPT status, the United States is convinced Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The Intelligence Community will be closely monitoring Tehran’s nuclear cooperation with Moscow for any direct assistance in support of a nuclear weapons program.
In January 2000, Moscow approved a draft cooperative program with Syria that included civil use of nuclear power. Broader access to Russian scientists and Russia’s large nuclear infrastructure could provide opportunities to solicit fissile material production expertise and other nuclear-related assistance if Syria decided to pursue nuclear weapons. In addition, Russia supplied India with material for its civilian nuclear program during this reporting period.
President Putin in May 2000 amended the presidential decree on nuclear exports to allow the export in exceptional cases of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment to countries that do not have full-scope IAEA safeguards. The move could clear the way for expanding nuclear exports to certain countries that do not have full-scope safeguards, such as India.
During the second half of 2000, Russian entities remained a significant source of dual-use biotechnology, chemicals, production technology, and equipment for Iran. Russia’s biological and chemical expertise makes it an attractive target for Iranians seeking technical information and training on BW and CW agent production processes.
Russia continues to be a major supplier of conventional arms. It is the primary source of ACW for China and India, it continues to supply ACW to Iran and Syria, and it has negotiated new contracts with Libya and North Korea.
Russia continues to be the main supplier of technology and equipment to India and China’s naval nuclear propulsion programs. In addition, Russia has discussed leasing nuclear-powered attack submarines to India.
The Russian Government’s commitment, willingness, and ability to curb proliferation-related transfers remain uncertain. The export control bureaucracy was reorganized again as part of President Putin’s broader government reorganization in May 2000. The Federal Service for Currency and Export Controls (VEK) was abolished and its functions assumed by a new department in the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. VEK had been tasked with drafting the implementing decrees for Russia’s July 1999 export control law; the status of these decrees is not known. Export enforcement continues to need improvement. In February 2000, Sergey Ivanov, then Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, said that during 1998-99 the government had obtained convictions for unauthorized technology transfers in three cases. The Russian press has reported on cases where advanced equipment is simply described as something else in the export documentation and is exported. Enterprises sometimes falsely declare goods to avoid government taxes.

NORTH  KOREA

Throughout the second half of 2000, North Korea continued to export significant ballistic missile–related equipment, components, materials, and technical expertise to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. P’yongyang attaches a high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology are one of the North’s major sources of hard currency, which fuel continued missile development and production.

CHINA

During this reporting period, Beijing continued to take a very narrow interpretation of its bilateral nonproliferation commitments with the United States. In the case of missile-related transfers, Beijing has on several occasions pledged not to sell Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I systems but has not recognized the regime’s key technology annex. China is not a member of the MTCR.
In November 2000, China committed not to assist, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons, and to enact at an early date a comprehensive missile-related export control system.
During the reporting period, Chinese entities provided Pakistan with missile-related technical assistance. Pakistan has been moving toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs with Chinese help. Pakistan also needs continued Chinese assistance to support development of the two-stage Shaheen-II MRBM. In addition, firms in China have provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to several other countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran, North Korea, and Libya.
In the nuclear area, China has made bilateral pledges to the United States that go beyond its 1992 NPT commitment not to assist any country in the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons. For example, in May 1996 Beijing pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
With respect to Pakistan, Chinese entities in the past provided extensive support to unsafeguarded as well as safeguarded nuclear facilities, which enhanced substantially Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability. We cannot rule out some continued contacts between Chinese entities and entities associated with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program subsequent to Beijing’s 1996 pledge and during this reporting period.
In October 1997, China gave the United States assurances regarding its nuclear cooperation with Iran. China agreed to end cooperation with Iran on supply of a uranium conversion facility and undertake no new cooperation with Iran after completion of two existing projects—a zero-power reactor and a zirconium production plant. Although the Chinese appear to have lived up to these commitments, we are aware of some interactions between Chinese and Iranian entities that have raised questions about its “no new nuclear cooperation” pledge. According to the State Department, the Administration is seeking to address these questions with appropriate Chinese authorities.
Prior to the reporting period, Chinese firms had supplied dual-use CW-related production equipment and technology to Iran. The US sanctions imposed in May 1997 on seven Chinese entities for knowingly and materially contributing to Iran’s CW program remain in effect. Evidence during the current reporting period shows Iran continues to seek such assistance from Chinese entities, but it is unclear to what extent these efforts have succeeded.
China is a primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan, Iran, and Sudan, among others. Sudan received military vehicles, naval equipment, guns, ammunition, and tanks from Chinese suppliers in the latter half of 2000.

WESTERN  COUNTRIES

As was the case in 1998 and 1999, entities in Western countries in 2000 were not as important as sources for WMD- and missile- related goods and materials as in past years. However, Iran and Libya continued to approach entities in Western Europe to provide needed acquisitions for their WMD and missile programs. Increasingly rigorous and effective export controls and cooperation among supplier countries have led the other foreign WMD and missile programs to look elsewhere for many controlled dual-use goods. Machine tools, spare parts for dual-use equipment, and widely available materials, scientific equipment, and specialty metals were the most common items sought. In addition, several Western countries announced their willingness to negotiate ACW sales to Libya.

TRENDS

As in previous reports, countries determined to maintain WMD and missile programs over the long term have been placing significant emphasis on increased self-sufficiency and attempts to insulate their programs against interdiction and disruption, as well as trying to reduce their dependence on imports by developing domestic production capabilities. Although these capabilities may not always be a good substitute for foreign imports—particularly for more advanced technologies—in many cases they may prove to be adequate. In addition, as their domestic capabilities grow, traditional recipients of WMD and missile technology could emerge as new suppliers of technology and expertise. Many of these countries—such as India, Iran and Pakistan—are not members of supplier groups such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime and do not adhere to their export constraints. In addition, private companies, scientists, and engineers in Russia, China, and India may be increasing their involvement in WMD- and missile-related assistance, taking advantage of weak or unenforceable national export controls and the growing availability of technology.
Some countries of proliferation concern are continuing efforts to develop indigenous designs for advanced conventional weapons and expand production capabilities, although most of these programs usually rely heavily on foreign technical assistance. Many of these countries—unable to obtain newer or more advanced arms—are pursuing upgrade programs for existing inventories.

11 Oct

Ritual Muslim Killing

Ritual Muslim Killing
A PLANNED conversion to Christianity from Islam is understood to have triggered a frenzied domestic dispute that led to the death of a Muslim mother on Monday night.
Bangladeshi-born Dr Muh-ammad Hussain, 49, remains under police guard in a critical condition in the Gold Coast Hospital as police piece together the circumstances leading to the death of his 41-year-old wife, Yasmine.
Mrs Hussain, who had arrived on the Gold Coast with her 17-year-old daughter at the weekend from Adelaide, died at her upmarket Southport apartment after receiving stab wounds to the chest.
A Muslim source told The Gold Coast Bulletin last night that Dr Hussain arrived a month ago to take up a position as a GP and prepare for his family to join him.

“From what we understand the daughter decided to tell her father of her radical plan to convert to Christianity which, in the eyes of most Muslims, is totally unacceptable and to be honest, sadly, many would react as he has done,” said the source.

“It is the Islamic way that if a son or daughter does or plans to do something that is unacceptable or wrong for a Muslim then it is the mother who is automatically at fault and will bear the brunt of the blame.”

Gold Coast police last night refused to deny or support the religious conversion motive, but are understood to be investigating it.
They said they had spent more than eight hours speaking to the traumatised 17-year-old daughter and because of her distressed state they still do not have a full picture of what happened.

“It has ended up in the death of a person so it has been a violent argument and a very tragic set of circumstances,” said Surfers Paradise CIB Detective Inspector John Hartwell.

Residents of the Smith Street, Albatross Park, complex where the family lived told The Bulletin yesterday they heard screams for half an hour.

“It was very quiet then there was a blood-curdling scream. It was terrible,” said Colin Currie.

Neighbour Caitlin Dalton was taking out the rubbish when she heard terrifying screams.

“She (the teenager) was yelling ‘help me, help me, they’re trying to kill me’,” said Ms Dalton.

“Everybody heard the screams but we couldn’t work out which unit they were coming from. “

“Then this girl emerged in the stairwell hysterical and crying.”

“Her clothes had been ripped off, she was just in her underwear, and she had quite severe scratches down her arm and across her back.”

Ms Dalton said as residents tried to comfort the girl, she told how she had wanted to ‘convert from the Islam religion … and obviously her father didn’t handle it very well’.

“She said her parents were really strict.”

Photographs taken by The Bulletin yesterday showed blood splattered throughout the three-bedroom luxury apartment which had a turkish carpet on the floor and leather upholstered chairs.
Clothing could be seen through the doorway, scattered across the floor near what appeared to be bloodstains. A large amount of blood had dried on the wall and on the carpet inside the front door, and there was blood on and around the doorknob.

“We saw one stretcher come out, then another one and another one,” said resident Rory Williams.

Det-Insp Hartwell said the Hussains had no family members living on the Gold Coast and police were looking after their daughter, who had turned 17 only a week ago.

“She is assisting police with our inquiries. She is not a suspect, merely a witness to what has transpired,” he said.

“Arrangements are being made through Crisis Care for accommodation for her at this stage, pending the contact of the next of kin and relatives.”

“At this stage we’ve been unable to locate the relatives, they’re all overseas.”

Det-Insp Hartwell said it was too early to say if any charges would be laid against Dr Hussain.

“This matter may end up in a criminal trial or may end up in a coroners court. Before we know the full facts I’m not willing to speculate,” he said.

“The outcome of the investigation will determine whether any charges are laid or a report is forwarded to the coroner.”

Dr Hussain completed his medical training at the Chittagong Medical College in Bangladesh in 1982.
In 2001, he completed a masters in family medicine in Australia and four years later was granted a fellowship by the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners.
But in the country with a population of more than 130 million, there are less than one million Christians.
It is understood Dr Hussain is a Sunni Muslim.

Wild Thing’s comment……
Seems to be the standard Moslem response to any and all controversy – kill somebody.

11 Oct

One Ringie Dingie From A Democrat

I had a weird thing happen that has never happened before in my entire life. haha I was on the computer getting some posts ready for today ( this was late yesterday afternoon just before dinner), and the phone rang.
Nick was watching Fox News so I didn’t want him to be disturbed so I got up and answered the phone. The caller ID said Democratic Committee. My eyes blinked twice and my jaw dropped. What the hell????
I said calmly: ….Hello
The woman’s voice (not a machine but a living breathing person) said…………” Is this Christine (I am leaving off my last name here on my blog)
I said: Yes it is what do you want?
She said: I am calling to ask you to be sure to vote for Christine Jennings who is running for Congress.
I said: How did you get my name and phone number?
She said: You are a registered voter in Florida and that is how we got your name and phone number.
I said: Indeed I am a registered voter. However, you have just called a Republican household.
She said: Yes but our goal is to turn Red Sates into Blue States. George Bush is a liar and we need to turn this country around and make important changes. Mr. Bush has been responsible for the deaths of thousands of our young men and women in a war that we never should have gone into. He has not lead this country as it should be lead. And the direction of what he has done needs to be changed and only the Democrat party can do this. We need to get our troops back home and stop them from being occupiers.
We will end the Republican culture of corruption and restore a government as good at the people it serves.
I said: Listen up and let me make this very clear to you.
First you have called a Republican home.
Second you have called a family that totally supports our military.
Third you called the home of a Veteran, my husband, and the daughter of a Veteran, and a niece of many Veterans….me!
Fourth you called a home that’s greatest desire is for our military to go after the terrorists.
Fifth the terrorists want to kill you Democrats just as much as they want to kill Republicans. Our political Party affiliation and yours has nothing to do with their goal. When they kneel you down in front of them with big knives in their filthy hands they will not be asking you if are you a Republican or a Democrat.
Sixth, no keep listening I am almost done and you called me, you interrupted my time not I yours so you need to listen to what I have to say. The sixth thing is that your party must be very desperate to BUY a list of voters, give no concern to respecting their parties choice and call them at their home to beg them to be turncoats and vote for a Democrat because YOU happen to drink the Kool-Aid of the Democratic party and believe their lies that Bush lied. Your party is the party of “ we stopped the Patriot Act” Harry Reid, giving secrets to China Clinton, pardoning terrorists Clinton’s and the pathological liars of both Bill and Hillary Clinton. I could go on for 10 hours of the list of all the things about the Clinton’s that they did, crimes, “gates”, and the rest of the Democratic Party.
And seventh and the one that really has pissed me off the most is this. You have the nerve to call this home and trash our military. So as for me, your party can go to hell. Goodbye

10 Oct

Producer Director David Zucker Makes Republican Ad – LOL



The DRUDGE REPORT has obtained an exclusive copy of a “scary” campaign advertisement created by Hollywood producer and director David Zucker that was intended to be used by GOP organizations in the closing weeks of the 2006 campaign.
However, the advertisement was deemed “too hot” by GOP strategists all across Washington, DC who have refused to use it!

In the ad, Zucker, producer of SCARY MOVIE 4, recreates former Clinton Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s 2000 visit to North Korea. During the visit, Secretary Albright presented North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il with a basketball autographed by former NBA superstar Michael Jordan.
An actress playing Secretary Albright is shown presenting Kim Jong Il with the Michael Jordan basketball, painting the walls of Osama bin Laden’s Afghanistan cave and turning a blind eye to suicide bombers. In one scene her skirt rips as she changes the tire of a Middle Eastern dictator’s limousine.
One GOP strategist said “jaws dropped” when the ad was first viewed. “Nobody could believe Zucker thought any political organization could use this ad. It makes a point, but it’s way over the top.”
Zucker is the producer and director of comedies such as “Airplane” and “The Naked Gun.” In 2004, Zucker, a longtime Democrat, embraced the Republican Party based on concerns he had about national security issues and voted for President George W. Bush.

Wild Thing’s comment…..
This is hysterical I love it. Heck I love anything that would tick off the lefties. heh heh